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Abstract
Urban energy transitions are key components of urgently requisite climate changemitigation.
Promissory discourse accords smart grids pride of placewithin them.We employ a living lab to study
smart grids as a solution geared towardsupscaling and systematisation, investigate their limits as a
climate changemitigation solution, and assess them rigorously as urban energy transitions.Our 18
month living lab simulates a household energymanagement platform inBergen.Norway’smitigation
focus promotes smartmeter roll-out as reducing carbon emissions, by (i)unlocking efficiency gains, and
(ii) increasing awareness for demand-sidemanagement.Weproblematise this discourse. Raising
awareness encounters intractable challenges for smart grid scalability. Scattered efficiency gains
constitutemodest increments rather than the substantial change requisite for rapidmitigation.Whereas
promissory smart grid discourse overlooks these ground-truthed limits, ourfindings caution against
misplaced expectations concerningmitigation.We contest discursive enthusiasmon smart grids and
argue for aligning local and systemic concerns before upscaling to avoid obscuring risks. Scaling up
requires understanding and addressing interdependencies and trade-offs across scales. Focus group
discussions and surveyswith living lab participantswhoused sub-metermonitors to track real-time
household electricity consumption data over an extendedperiod show that technical issues and energy
behaviour, aswell as political economic andpolicy structures and factors, pose significant limits to smart
grids.Urban strategies for climate changemitigationmust be informedby this recognition.Our results
indicate that upscaling relies onbottom-uppopular acceptanceof the salient technical, organisational
and standardisationmeasures, but thatmeasures to improve the democratic legitimacy of and
participation in energy transitions remainweak.Wehighlight limits to smart grids as a standalone urban
mitigation solution and call for a sharper focus onaccompanying thrust areas for systematisation and
scalability, such as renewable energy integration and grid coordination.
Introduction
Smart electricity agendas and imaginaries project an
image of ‘users’ as prime beneficiaries. Part of this
agenda, here termed the promissory discourse on
smart grids, assumes and emphasises a need for
‘behavioural change’ by users to facilitate more
efficient energy consumption. Emerging scholarship
challenges such characterisation by problematising
what motivates people to engage in energy efficiency
measures. Our argument supports this challenge.
Based on amulti-faceted empirical study, we show that
expectations of and demands for behavioural change
are not representative of current socio-technical devel-
opments. The discourse about the potential of smart
grids for climate change mitigation promises too
much; it must be corrected in order to examine and
achieve their real potential.
A promissory discourse is constituted by influen-
tial agendas promoted by specific actors to set out
shared collective horizons for action—in this case
smart grids—in a given domain. The discursive con-
struction and the gradual elision of facts and claims in
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with a performative element. This serves to inspire and
attract various kinds of innovation actors into colla-
boration. A particular social imaginary of a smart grid
mobilises policy developments that support and
incentivise certain socio-technical futures while delet-
ing alternatives that are at odds with the dominant dis-
course (Ballo 2015).
A mismatch between promissory discourse on
smart grids (e.g. Amin 2015) and their capacity to deli-
ver, motivates this intervention on a policy and aca-
demic concern that has pressing relevance for climate
change mitigation. Drawing on academic and policy
documents, we characterise the discourse on scaling
up smart grids as a means for mitigation; and sum-
marise a critique of ‘Resource Man’ (Strengers 2014),
the image of ‘an efficient and well-informed micro-
resource manager who exercises control and choice
over his consumption and energy options’ (Strengers
2013, p 34). Our approach is grounded in a view of
human behaviour as based on a complex set of factors
(see Abrahamse et al 2005). We problematise the com-
mon understanding of ‘scaling up’ as dependent sim-
ply on the development of standards aimed at creating
new infrastructure such as smart grids. Rather, scaling
up involves many interdependencies and often fea-
tures trade-offs between systemic gains and localised
losses (see Frantzeskaki and Loorbach 2010, Silvast
2017), including to democratic participation. We
argue that for infrastructural change to work towards
objectives like climate change mitigation, the systemic
must be aligned with the local across a whole range of
applications and parameters before upscaling (see
Bhatt et al 2014).
Alignment requires encountering and resolving
problems and trade-offs, the premise for our living lab
in the Norwegian city of Bergen in parallel with the
roll-out of smart meters across Norway. By providing
households with sub-meter monitors that simulated
numerous potential smart grid functionalities, the liv-
ing lab engaged with localised concerns to identify
scope for such alignment under systemic upscaling of
smart grids as an urban solution for climate change
mitigation. Voytenko et al (2016, p 45) characterise
living labs as featuring ‘geographical embeddedness,
experimentation and learning, participation and user
involvement, leadership and ownership, and evalua-
tion and refinement’. Ours featured innovations to
empower interested citizens with information and
incentives, and investigated the societal, ethical and
environmental dimensions of smart electricity, mainly
fromusers’ perspectives.
The living lab design aimed to set up supportive
conditions for behavioural changes geared towards
efficiency gains, and enabled study of how this pans
out in practice (Liedtke et al 2012). In keeping with
behavioural economics views, we included gamifica-
tion to target ‘homo ludens’ (see Rodriguez 2006), the
play-driven ideal-type counterpart to rational choice-
driven ‘homo economicus’. We held focus group
discussions to qualitatively study what actually moti-
vates people to engage in energy efficiency measures
(see also Gram-Hanssen 2010, Korsnes et al 2018). By
virtue of a sub-meter monitor installed at no cost to
households, participants gained real-time access to
device-level consumption data via a smartphone
application. They also received inputs to encourage
energy-saving practices via monthly newsletters, com-
plemented by an online scoring system and anon-
ymised profile comparisons with participating
households (details in ‘Data and methods’). Hence,
whereas the project centred on technical measures in
line with main policy agendas, our inquiry into what
actually motivates people crucially included questions
of participation and democracy.
Participants evidently voiced more engagement
with political economy issues than behavioural change
aspects. Some functions associated with smart grids
surface as being suited for automation, with a generally
positive outlook on dynamic pricing by these tech-
savvy, highly educated participants. Political economic
roadblocks tomore disruptive and exponential benefits
from the advent of smart grids, however, indicate a
need for deeper regulatory and institutional changes.
These findings buttress arguments by Wolsink (2012)
and Verbong et al (2013), and crucially also raise ques-
tions of energy democracy (see Burke and Stephens
2018, but see also Graham and Marvin 2002). Such
changes are important for revolutionising the electricity
sector, and electrifying other sectors like transport, to
the far-reaching extent required to meet urgent climate
changemitigation targets.
But scaling up a sociotechnical system as complex
as the electric grid is known to entail a cost, and should
thus be treated carefully and with some scepticism to
ensure a strategy that is robustly informed by factors at
multiple scales (Sareen andHaarstad 2018). It requires
an approach to systematisation that is more attuned to
localised social practices, and to how these may be
aligned with interlinked developments elsewhere,
than the current promissory discourse on smart grids
affords. Change agendas are susceptible to path
dependence and co-optation by private interests
(Vesnic-Alujevic et al 2016), and risk yielding sub-
optimal outcomes on climate change mitigation. Our
living lab approach points to the need and possibility of
including energy users and publics, not as add-ons to a
technocratic process, but as participants in key decisions
concerning our common energy future (see Hoffman
and High-Pippert 2005). We argue that such ontological
politics are key for climate change mitigation when
upscaling smart grids inurbanenergy transitions.
This paper offers some pointers from our study
towards aligning localised concerns and systemic ones
for upscaling smart grids. Emphasising limits to smart
grids as a standalone urban mitigation solution can
sharpen focus on accompanying thrust areas for sys-
tematisation and scalability, such as renewables inte-
gration and grid coordination. Efforts to scale upmust
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secure bottom-up popular acceptance of the salient
technical, organisational and standardisation mea-
sures. Without such alignment, we caution that the
promissory discourse around upscaling smart grids
is in need of a reality check on the key registers we
identify: technical, energy behavioural and political
economic. Before presenting the study, the following
sub-section elaborates the link between upscaling and
promissory discourse.
Theorising promissory discourse on smart grids and
upscaling
The discourse on smart grids resonates with other
‘smart’ discourses, especially ‘smart cities’, which are
incredibly powerful, as promise and spectacle. Globally,
smart city imaginaries havemobilised billions of dollars
in diverse contexts over the past decade. Smart grids are
imbricated within these discursive constructions, and
interwovenwith the urban fabric these imaginaries seek
to ‘smarten’ by strategically redirecting urban develop-
ment funds. Consequently, the promissory discourse of
smart urban futures relies on a particular vision of the
smart grid that it bankrolls andhopes to produce.
Promissory discourse on smart grids aligns this
consequential vision with another desirable aspect of
urban evolution, namely climate change mitigation.
Cities emit 70% of global carbon emissions and host
half the world population; thus, major initiatives and
investments like smart grids gain traction through
claims that align their growth prospects with urban
mitigation solutions. Even lip service tomitigation tar-
gets helps depoliticise challenges and weaken resist-
ance to particular new interventions (Blühdorn and
Deflorian 2019). Earnest belief in upscaling smart
grids as mitigation solutions can also play on a strong
existing discourse on energy efficiency and shape the
urban growth agenda (Janda and Topouzi 2015). At
stake here is public discussion and decision-making
on urban energy futures in line with urgent mitigation
needs (Demski et al 2015), versus the financing ofmas-
sive energy infrastructure commitments and codifica-
tion of particular grid logics and path dependencies.
These latter forces can freeze in place a social imagin-
ary of smart grids based on ideal-type characterisa-
tions of this socio-technical intervention.
One ideal-type that the promissory smart grid dis-
course draws on is ResourceMan, amasculine imagin-
ary whose decisions are driven by economic rationality
and a will to maximise efficiency (Strengers 2014).
This assumption constitutes a main basis for ideas of
behavioural change under smart grid roll-out that
characterise humans as seeking to maximise utility
under perfect information conditions. These ideas
have been roundly critiqued in empirically-informed
studies of energy use and human-infrastructure
interactions within practice theory and energy anthro-
pology scholarship (e.g. Abrahamse et al 2005,
Gram-Hanssen 2010, Smith and High 2017). But
within the dominant capitalist regime that char-
acterises most energy market design, Resource Man
retains a strong performative function and continued
influence.
There is a need to balance out this supply-side dis-
cursive power with user perspectives and the kinds of
dynamics evoked by channelling them (Delina and
Janetos 2018). Scholars increasingly acknowledge that
misrecognition at multiple scales drives injustice
under energy transition (Bridge et al 2013). Calling for
attention to the spatial scale in energy transitions,
Späth and Rohracher (2014, p 118) argue that local
efforts can impact ‘local socio-technical configura-
tions, but also influence public debates of national or
even international reach’, and ‘establish and align sup-
portive institutions, visions and actor networks and
facilitate changes also beyond the locality’. This holds
even if identified local phenomena challenge hege-
monic discursive trends; hence we call for increased
attention to political economic aspects overlooked in
the promissory discourse on upscaling smart grids.
Subsequent sections describe our data and meth-
ods, present and discuss the results, and offer conclud-
ing reflections on the study’s implications for smart
grid upscaling formitigation.
Data andmethods
Testing for local and systemic alignment
The living lab that is our empirical focus herewas part of a
Joint Programming InitiativeUrbanEuropeproject called
PARENT2, featuring amixofpartners fromacademia and
industryduring2016–2019.PARENTran three living labs
between late2017andearly2019.These comprised several
dozen households in each of three cities—Amsterdam,
Brussels, and Bergen. The project website states its aim ‘to
provide communities with the technology and support
to help reduce energy consumption in their homes and to
investigate ways inwhich communities canwork towards
more sustainable life styles3’.
Each living lab was run autonomously by relevant
local partners; this piece focuses on the Bergen Living
Lab (BLL). This comprised 46 households who self-
selected as participants in response to a public city-
wide call circulated through local networks.We expec-
ted this snowballing, word-of-mouth, network-based
strategy to approximately proxy purposive selection,
so that participants would tend to be environmentally-
minded, well-educated, and largely tech-savvy. Such a
groupwould in theory feature some of the likeliest citi-
zens to enact behavioural change based on informa-
tion generated during BLL.
Participants received a complimentary sub-meter
monitor called Smappee, available online4. A technician
2
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facilitated free installation upon request. By down-
loading an application, participants accessed real-time
household electricity consumption data disaggregated
by individual devices via a smartphone or web browser.
They could visualise consumption over time by device,
both ‘always on’ consumption and live variable compo-
nents, and were offered ‘smart plugs’ to help identify
specific devices where Smappee’s algorithmwas insuffi-
ciently precise. The platform had a browser interface
that gamified the experience for participants. It posed
challenges that encouraged environmentally friendly
practices with associated points and ranking—partici-
pants could also compare energy consumption with
other householdsmatched onparameters such as num-
ber of inhabitants and area. Participating households
could be anonymous on this platform, but allowed the
BLL project team to access data for analytical purposes.
Participants received monthly newsletters with energy
saving tips, activity updates, event invitations, and start-
up and closing survey questionnaires.
A steering group of BLL participants with some
domain-specific knowledge and interest, and a group
of all interested BLL participants, were invited for
focus group discussions at initial, midway and closing
stages. Five such focus group discussions were audio
recorded, transcribed and analysed for this paper. In
October 2018, BLL participants interacted with the
PARENT consortium, accompanied by a ‘Smappee
deconstruction workshop’, where a BLL participant
dismantled a Smappee and we discussed its inner
workings together.
The living lab yielded two kinds of outputs. One is
quantitative tracking of real-time consumption from
late 2017 to early 2019, which showed scattered change
and is not the focus of analysis here (but see table A1 in
appendix A for overview comparisons of household
consumption during January-February 2018 versus
2019 and tables B1–B10 in appendix B for some parti-
cipant feedback after the living lab). The other output
comprises qualitative insights from focus group dis-
cussions. These discussions and meetings followed a
consistent format: each began with technical aspects
(device installation, energy management platform
roll-out), proceeded to everyday energy practices, and
then took up political economy issues. ‘Scaling up’was
in this sense intrinsic to the ontology of our shared
enquiry with living lab participants (see Hirschman
and Holbrook 1986), pertaining to smart meter
deployment towards a systemic smart grid in Norway.
We mirror this sequence—from technical aspects to
everyday practices to political economy issues—in our
structure for reporting findings.
In the next section, we present and analyse insights
into household energy practices concerning smart
meter uptake and use. These have numerous implica-
tions for smart grid roll-out in urban Norway and
more broadly. The conclusion returns to the promis-
sory discourse on upscaling smart grids and mitiga-
tion. We discuss what key factors foregrounded by the
BLL merit consideration for this promise to be borne
out in practice, challenged or adjusted.
Results and discussion
Implications for smart grid roll-out
In this short piece, we focus on issues that surfaced
during our focus group sessions and bear on the
intersections of motivation, engagement, broader
participation, and scaling (up). We deal with these on
three distinct but nonetheless interconnected levels:
technical, energy behaviour, and political economy,
using select quotes interwoven with the narrative
below. These results informour subsequent reflections
on whether and how smart grids can in fact be
upscaled to be part of urban climate changemitigation
strategies.
At the technical level we first note that a technical
device like Smappee works well for triggering partici-
pants’ curiosity and fascination. The latter pertains
especially to the promise of ‘plug and play’, where the
device will presumably reveal hitherto hidden patterns
in the consumption of the household. Whereas this
interest to some extent persisted throughout the pro-
ject, a majority of participants reported troubles with
the device: first, installation (into the household’s fuse
box) was more difficult than expected, and several
needed assistance from an electrician. This settled, the
device had problems recognising the household appli-
cations, and people had trouble ‘teaching’ it the differ-
ences between them. To quote a participant: ‘I had
detected the heating cables (floor heaters) in the hall-
way and the heating cables at the bathroom, and the
stove in the kitchenK After a while I found out that it
wasn’t quite like that, it wasK now it [the switch]was
off on the wall, but then it was on in the app.’ Another
queried ‘Are they separate circuits? Could it be react-
ing to one and not the other?’ to which the first replied
‘I don’t know.’
These problems were reported as ‘demotivating’,
and so worked to turn people away from participation.
One said ‘The new app looked promising. More user-
friendly. But it’s just not working K I thought it was
silly, because I was quite keen on using it.’ Another
added that ‘discovering the right things in the house
has been difficult K I lost inspiration to really try
again, if it doesn’t improve. It seemed inaccurate.’
Another quipped: ‘You in a way hit a wall, then you
lose inspiration5’. Among the technically proficient
participants, few believed that this kind of free-stand-
ing device will be used in the future, but found it possi-
ble that it nevertheless points in relevant directions:
several mentioned how houses and buildings are
becoming smarter with more interactivity and
5
Some frustration with Smappee is apparent from tables B3 and B4
of appendix B, where a majority of participants report decreased
interest in Smappee over time and dissatisfaction with its identifica-
tion of device-level energy consumption.
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information exchange built in, hence ‘hidden in the
walls’. But they did also express concern over the
potential implications for privacy. To quote one parti-
cipant on this emerging Internet of Things, ‘Opening
up this Pandora’s box of them getting information that
we don’t formally consent to giving is a big issue’6.
As concerns energy behaviour, several of the focus
group participants reported that they already took an
interest in energy consumption before joining the pro-
ject, and that this may have been part of their reason
for signing up in the first place. One mentioned that
‘Actually getting info about all the power units, in my
case, there would not be any changes for my power
consumption, but now I am perhaps above average
based on the energy consumption in the first place, so I
plan everything according to how the energy flows in
the house.’ This complicates the possibility for asses-
sing (or ‘measuring’) the impact of Smappee or the
platform. Some participants reported that they could
‘have done the same’without any technicalmeasures.
Table 1 reports consumption and production data
for four participants who were solar prosumers, for
the months of January and February in both 2018 and
2019. Monthly temperature averages were the same
for January 2018 and 2019 at 3 degrees Celsius, and
lower for February 2018 compared with February
2019, 1 versus 5 degrees Celsius respectively7. Except
for January 2018 versus 2019 for household 2, a trend
of notable decreases in year-on-year monthly con-
sumption is evident for both months. For this small
sub-population of especially environmentally-minded
and tech-savvy ‘early adopters8’, it is possible that
more precise real-time monitoring via Smappee con-
tributed to energy savings. One of these participants
stated this explicitly: ‘These are not things I was doing
before the project, because I had no control or insight
into what it really cost me before installing Smappee,
and afterwards I could monitor and reduce consump-
tion. So rather than the fact that I bought solar panels,
it was because of the real-time monitoring of this
project that I probably saved more money9’. For the
other participants, who were not prosumers,
appendix A shows more mixed results with no clear
trend.
One participant argued for monitoring behaviour
over time, and while Smappee can be of some help
here, maintainingmotivation and interest proved pro-
blematic. An interesting topic brought up by this BLL
participant was whether people really want to change
behaviour in this way (i.e. by having their consump-
tion patterns continuously monitored and commu-
nicated to them), or whether this is a good example of
tasks that should rather be automated. In their own
words: ‘I think if it is going to work for ordinary peo-
ple, then it must be automated. Because you don’t get
the common person to keep track of what they are
using at all times’. Another participant weighed in that
‘It’s a bit like taking a backup. If you have to do it your-
selfK you will remember every day for the first week,
then you do it only once a week the first three weeks,
and suddenly six weeks have passed and your comp-
uter breaks downK I think it’s important that there is
a central enabling of automationKit has to be the sim-
plest form, but also enablingmore advanced formsK’.
This prompts us to ask: why indeed are ‘smart
electricity’ technologies targeting energy behaviour,
and not energy consumption directly? In countries
such as Finland, Sweden, the UK and Portugal, we see
similar developments: away from ‘awareness raising’
and towards automation, frequently in tandem with
mechanisms of dynamic pricing (Silvast et al 2018). A
quite general perception among our participants was
that this is ‘almost certain to come’.
The question of what motivates people came up in
several contexts. The main interest (among Norwe-
gians) for changing energy behaviour was generally
reported as stemming from environmental concerns,
the perception being that Norwegians are spoiled with
cheap (and relatively clean) energy. Economic con-
cerns may have some bearing on the issues but were
not all that important. Norwegians were described as a
bit pampered, and not really concerned much about
their consumption. Some of the more highly moti-
vated participants reported that they were not able to
reduce their energy consumption more than they had
Table 1.Electricity consumption and production by household (January-February 2018 and 2019)a.

























1 1–2 House >130 3203 23 2015 1 2674 80 1834 1
2 4 House >130 2004 2 2333 — 1899 — 1527 —
3 1–2 House >130 5862 63 3807 26 5819 115 2866 73
4 5 House >130 — — 3026 13 6093 108 2481 50
a con=Consumption, pro=Production.
6
Follow-up individual interview conducted on 07May 2019.
7
Based onpublicly available temperature data accessed on 10May 2019
at https://timeanddate.com/weather/norway/bergen/historic.
8
While rooftop solar energy has recently begun to grow rapidly in
Norway, it remains relatively expensive and households with
installed solar capacity in 2017were rare.
9
Follow-up individual interview conducted on 09May 2019.
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done already, and that this would require further tech-
nical fixes or technological measures (e.g. improved
energy efficiency). Some also reported decisive limits
in terms of everyday routines that are not easy to
change (picking up the children after school, going
home to cook dinner, etc).
Some participants responded positively to gamifi-
cation: especially highlighted here was the possibility
to compare with other (similar) households in one’s
area. Relatedly, the visual impacts of the sub-meter
device were pointed out as having some potential,
since things are perceived to bemore convincing when
one can point to a screen displaying a graph and num-
bers. These visual aspects were also pointed to by peo-
ple debating the social dimensions of the device:
showing it to friends, colleagues and visitors, and the
screen and the graphs, data and numbers.
Coming finally to the political ecocomy issues, dis-
cussions turned quite lively. A number of topics and
issues were touched upon: in terms of motivation and
participation, we saw strong interest in questions of
where energy comes from, in terms of country of ori-
gin and energy source (i.e. through green certificates).
In Norway, strong controversies persist over whether
Norway should integrate its energy system, which is
often portrayed as clean and green, with Europe or
other neighbouring countries, since this seems to
introduce a number of ‘impure’ energy sources, such
as coal and nuclear, to theNorwegian system.Whereas
some argue that Norway should retain its ‘clean’
energy for its own purposes, others argue that climate
and energy issues are global, and that we should inte-
grate and collaborate, with Europe and beyond. To
quite an extent, the BLL participants questioned many
of these assumptions, arguing that energy production,
distribution and consumption have long been inte-
grated with other countries, and that a main driving
force has been Norway’s desire to sell surplus energy
abroad. Questions were also posed about the idea that
Norwegian energy provisions, mainly based on hydro-
electric power, are by default ‘green’. Sweden aban-
doned this idea 15 years ago; in Sweden, it is mainly
solar and wind that count as green and renewable, as
hydroelectric power destroys rivers andwater systems.
There seemed to be general agreement upon the
Norwegian energy system thus being predicated on
industrial and political interests. A participant opined
that ‘It is Norwegian industry and policymakers push-
ing for these developments, the spot market Nord
Pool; not ‘Europe’’, a sentiment that does not necessa-
rily penetrate public or political discussions. Whereas
there was general agreement that the debate is there-
fore to some (or even a great) extent predicated on
false moralism, this did not translate into agreement
on action at political levels. An important issue here
also pertains to trust in institutions: it may seem rea-
sonable to have this kind of collaboration across bor-
ders, but trust in institutions was an overarching and
oft-repeated problem: from the local energy company,
to the grid operator, to multi-scalar institutions
(regional, national and European). Speaking about
cross-border energy exchange, one participant stated
‘I am principally in favour of this, but I am not sure
about the way it is done in just that way. Andwhere the
money goes, should be more transparent, to put it
nicely.’ Here, it seems that the broader conditions for
effective collaboration were lacking. Yet, extant scho-
larship indicates that it is exactly such trust, and such
institutions, that are required if smart energy produc-
tion, distribution and consumption are to be scaled up
(seeWolsink 2012, Savirimuthu 2013, Ballo 2015).
Trust also came up in relation to privacy issues. A
smart meter, like a sub-meter monitor, generates huge
amounts of person sensitive data (EDPS 2012). If the
tendency towards automation noted above persists,
the potential inclusion of new technologies such as
Internet of Things and blockchain could drastically
exacerbate such concerns. Our living lab was seen as
trustworthy in this regard, since it was small-scale, not
connected to commercial interests, and not connected
to the public smart metering project. People were
more concerned about the general, state mandated
roll-out of smart meters, and their interactions with
other devices or policies, such as in-house alarms and
insurance schemes. As above, themain problem seems
to be generally low trust in power companies and
grid operators, but also national and European
institutions.
In sum, our living lab surfaced technical, energy
behavioural and political economic complexities
linked with smart meter roll-out. The results briefly
discussed above and the data shared in the appendices
challenge the prommisory discourse. They highlight
dimensions that merit serious consideration in rela-
tion to the climate change mitigation potential of
upscaling smart grids. Participatory design and imple-
mentation emerge as crucial dimensions of smart grid
roll-out, spanning technical, behavioural and political
economic domains.
Conclusion
Situating smart grids in climate changemitigation
strategies
Ourstudybrings forwardevidenceofamismatchbetween
promissory discourse on smart grids and their capacity to
deliver mitigation solutions. Beyond simply developing
standards to create smart grids, scaling up requires under-
standing and addressing interdependencies and trade-offs
across scales (Frantzeskaki and Loorbach 2010, Bhatt et al
2014, Silvast 2017), such as painstaking consideration of
privacy concerns in democratic contexts. Intra-household
technical issues and energy behaviour, as well as political
economic and policy structures and factors, indicate
significant limits to smart grids. We argue that explicit
recognition of these limits must inform urban strategies
for climate changemitigation in the energy transition.
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Such recognition can resoundingly close public
discourse and perception of smart grids as necessarily
harbingers of sustainability (Ballo 2015), and pro-
blematise prevalent state narratives by inserting citizen
concerns into the public debate (see Vesnic-Alujevic
et al 2016). It can turn focus towards the potential for
automation and dynamic tariffs to contribute to miti-
gation efforts by streamlining policies and political
economic factors towards greater grid flexibility and
renewables integration (see Sareen and Kale 2018).
This is especially important given the current and
future rapid electrification of other sectors, especially
transport (both land-based and ferries) in Norwegian
cities like Bergen, which present challenges that smart
grids can help address. Yet, as we have seen, suchmea-
sures can give rise to tensions around privacy and gen-
eralised distrust in energy companies, grid operators
and institutions at various scales. There is thus a need
to closely examine these factors and identify ways to
resolve them.
The BLL results show that household smartmeters
in themselves are not the solution that needs to be
scaled for smart grid-related mitigation gains. Atten-
tion is already shifting, also in public discourse, to the
scope for automation and dynamic tariffs to support
grid flexibility and increasing renewables integration.
But deliberative, evidence-based decision-making for
emphatically pro-public energy futures must inform
automation (see Demski et al 2015). Careful public
policy and planning can champion scales, sources, dis-
tribution and ownership models of future electricity
generation that minimise carbon-intensive transmis-
sion infrastructure expansion and ecosystem service
disruptions (Sareen andHaarstad 2018).
While our study did not focus on automation and
dynamic tariffs, we hope future research will examine
these to inform an enabling policy framework with
diverse, cosmopolitan imaginaries (Delina and Janetos
2018). Accompanying cross-sectoral and political eco-
nomic pushes can help translate smart grid functional-
ities into multi-scalar renewable energy integration
and thus into gains for climate change mitigation. For
instance, electric-vehicle-to-grid regulations for grid
flexibility are being embedded within urban cross-sec-
toral decarbonisation strategies (Sørensen et al 2018),
and political economic concerns are modulating the
expansion of grid interconnections in the Nordic
region which would increase flexibility in national
renewable energymixes (Sovacool et al 2018).
The role of households in mitigation efforts based
on smart grids can indeed be scalable (see Späth and
Rohracher 2014), but first smart grids have to be
understood correctly and publicly acknowledged as
having particular tendencies and limits. Where these
limits are determined by political economy, the
correction of public discourse and perception to be
explicit about these actual drivers will create a more
constructive environment for energy policies that
maximise the mitigation potential of smart grids
under energy transitions. How is this correction of
public discourse to take place?
Existing scholarship suggests that awareness
through engagement spurs social mobilisation (Hoff-
man and High-Pippert 2005, Burke and Stephens
2018); thus, proactive public deliberation can correct
the sort of promissory discourse that the BLL results
challenge. There is a need to shift from ‘hero stories’ to
‘learning stories’ in goal-setting for energy transitions
(Janda and Topouzi 2015). To support energy transi-
tions, sustained academic pushes can counteract hol-
low performances of sustainability and build a culture
of substantively evidencing sustainability claims to
support energy transitions (Blühdorn and Deflorian
2019). Hence, disrupting business-as-usual promis-
sory discourses, such as around smart meters, with a
publicly-engaged evidence base as with the PARENT
project, represents a vital step towards unlocking deep
and rapid climate mitigation solutions and identifying
how to scale them.
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AppendixA. January-February household
electricity consumption for 2018 and 2019
Of the 46 households that participated, 43 installed the
Smappee and shared data with the project from late
2017 to early 2019. The earliest began in October 2017
while most joined by January 2018. The Bergen living
lab formally concluded December 2018 but some
households continued to share data till April 2019.
Table A1 provides an overview of household electricity
consumption figures for 39 households during Janu-
ary and February 2018 and 2019, as these enable
comparison during the same months of the year.
Corresponding data for both electricity consumption
and production for four participating households
during the same period which produced photovoltaic
electricity as well is reported separately in the manu-
script. Households for which figures are available for
all four months are shown in italics. Overall, changes
in electricy consumption are scattered and do not
show a single clear trend.
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Appendix B. An overview of responses by
participants on pertinent Bergen living lab
concerns
Ten tables based on an online survey after participa-
tion in the Bergen living lab (12 respondents). Ques-
tions and responses have been translated from
Norwegian into English.
TableA1.Electricity consumption by household (January-February 2018 and January-February 2019).
January 2019 versus 2018 February 2019 versus 2018













1 1–2 Apartment <70 515 848 +65 428 598 +40
2 1–2 House <70 — 628 NA — 607 NA
3 1–2 Apartment <70 — — NA 1154 — NA
4 1–2 Apartment <70 1309 — NA 1395 — NA
5 1–2 Apartment <70 — — NA — 906 NA
6 1–2 House 71–100 5517 3674 (−)33 5716 2792 (−)51
7 1–2 Apartment 71–100 1042 957 (−)8 931 698 (−)25
8 1–2 Apartment 71–100 612 1037 +69 513 794 +55
9 1–2 Apartment 71–100 — 844 NA 1321 816 (−)38
10 1–2 House 71–100 1468 — NA 1341 — NA
11 3 Apartment 71–100 497 — NA 401 — NA
12 1–2 Apartment 71–100 1408 — NA — NA
13 4 Apartment 101–130 3696 2121 (−)43 3342 1612 (−)52
14 4 House 101–130 2732 2587 (−)5 2509 2018 (−)20
15 1–2 House 101–130 — 2818 NA 2646 2045 (−)23
16 1–2 Apartment 101–130 2039 — NA 46 — NA
17 1–2 House 101–130 3172 — NA 2965 — NA
18 1–2 House 101–130 — 3160 NA — 2542 NA
19 4 Apartment >130 2700 2775 +3 2540 2189 (−)14
20 1–2 House >130 4576 4025 (−)12 3794 3399 (−)10
21 5 House >130 4794 5014 +5 4943 3487 (−)29
22 5 House > 130 3778 3788 0 3868 3133 (−)19
23 1–2 House >130 3025 3476 +15 3047 2549 (−)16
24 5 House >130 2955 3043 +3 2809 2433 (−)13
25 3 House >130 1209 1261 +4 1151 972 (−)16
26 3 House >130 1742 2218 +27 1644 1847 +12
27 5 House >130 4391 4514 +3 3886 3418 (−)12
28 5 House >130 2013 1729 (−)14 1758 1392 (−)21
29 1–2 House >130 5604 3026 (−)46 5454 — NA
30 1–2 House >130 1557 1372 (−)12 1366 — NA
31 3 House >130 5114 2142 (−)58 — 1595 NA
32 5 House >130 3964 — NA 3754 — NA
33 >5 Apartment >130 1113 — NA 986 — NA
34 1–2 House >130 3446 — NA 2941 — NA
35 4 House >130 5229 — NA 4807 — NA
36 1–2 House >130 2728 — NA 2437 — NA
37 1–2 House >130 3908 — NA 3210 — NA
38 5 House >130 — 3338 NA — 2322 NA
39 3 House >130 — 2515 NA — 2236 NA








Newsletter 2 9 1
Gamification graphs 3 7 2
Gamification challenges 3 4 5
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Table B3.Change in interest in Smappee over time.
Yes, decreased over time No, remained constant
Change in interest in Smappee 10 2
Table B4. Satisfactionwith Smappee and device level energy use identification.
Activity/effect Dissatisfied Neutral Mostly satisfied
Satisfactionwith Smappee 3 3 6
Satisfactionwith device level energy use identification 9 3 0
Table B2. Feedback on engagement in Bergen living lab activities (n=12×4)a.
Activity/effect Neutral Some positive Very positive Irrelevant
4meetings andworkshops 2 16 7 23
Note. NB:Most participants took part only in some events, so this questionwas asked separately for each of the 3 focus group discussions and
theworkshop, whichwere open to all participants.
a 7/12 liked in-personmeetingsmost (separate question).
Table B5. Frequency of checking app.
Activity/frequency Many times aweek Weekly Once amonth Less thanmonthly
Checking app 4 4 1 3
Table B6. Self-assessment of learning from the project.
Activity/effect Maybe a little Yes, a bit A lot
Learning fromproject 4 7 1
Table B7. Suggestions for potential improvements.
‘I would have liked to go to some professional lectures/seminars that went a littlemore in depth on smappee/energy consumption etc’.
‘Seemed to be too little clarity onwhat the goals of the project were’.
‘The theme anddiscussions have always interestedme. The technical solutionwith Smappee I think is straightforward and interesting in that
you could extract data frommy consumption. Formy own part I eventually fell ‘off the bandwagon’ and have probably not checkedmy
data in the past year’.
‘More practical training in the app itself on how to identify each electric article in the house’
‘Comparisonwith other users should have been linked to climate conditions andwhich energy sources are used for heating’.
‘Could have beenmore informationmeetings’
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